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INTRODUCTION
Growing up, parents and teachers alike preached to us the
idea that some words are “bad words.” And we naive children,
hearing this idea from towering authority figures, accepted their
wisdom as law. Until we did not. Until that one daring day, be
it at five or fifteen years old, when we first experimented with a
“bad word,” and learned that saying something bad can feel so
good. After crossing that threshold, and dropping our first fbomb, the stigma began to fade. We realized that words are just
words; we were not going to be thrown in jail for saying “h-edouble hockey sticks.” The parental penal code forbidding them
was not a real thing.
The good news is that we were all mostly right: saying
bad words is not a one-way ticket to jail. The bad news is, until
2011, North Carolina had a statute saying the opposite: it was a
misdemeanor to use “indecent or profane language” in public.1
The worse news, at least for anyone in Virginia, is that the use of
profanity in public is still a criminal offense.2 Fuck that.
As a U.S. citizen in the 21st century, taking free speech
for granted is easy. Rewind a few centuries, however, and the
foundational First Amendment that we conveniently invoke to
protect our opinions and ourselves was not around. 3 The
fundamental idea 4 is that “Congress shall make no law
*
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respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”5 Although
the drafters were explicit in declaring basic First Amendment
freedoms to which all Americans are entitled, they failed to delve
deeper and define their terms. The nation “shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech,” because in the aftermath of
the Revolutionary War, we valued the idea of speech without
consequences. 6 Unlike other nations, we decided that citizens
ought not to be arrested (or worse) for criticizing the
government. 7 In the shadow of this progressive political
movement, however, traditional or prudish approaches to
profanity restricted just how free speech should actually be.8
The First Amendment was not written on a blank slate;
profanity was already penalized. “At common law, it [was] an
offense to utter obscene words in public . . . .”9 The common law
rule stems from the idea that “upon the foundations of the law of
nature and the law of revelation all human laws depend.”10 Put
differently, the common law rules were made to keep man in
line, and part of what it meant to be “in line” was to “not offend
against the rules of public decency” and instead “keep[] his
wickedness to himself.” 11 Further, “if [man] makes his vices
public . . . it is then the business of human laws to correct
them.” 12 These common law rules applied to public profanity
because, foundationally, it is indecent to expose “one’s person to
the public view,” 13 and, likewise, “outrageously vulgar and
obscene words . . . if uttered in the ear of the public [are no] less
likely to shock any one’s sense of decency, and to corrupt the
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public morals and decency, they fall within the proper jurisdiction of the temporal
courts”).
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morals of society.” 14 Therefore, because expressing profanity
“shock[ed] any one’s sense of decency,” profanity violated the
common law.15
Reconciling this common law demand for restricting
speech 16 with the Framers’ decision to draft a bill of rights is
linear: the First Amendment was a repudiation of the common
law. “There is, however, precious little record of what freedom
of speech and of the press really meant to the framers.”17 Despite
“insistent demand” for protection of the freedoms enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, that demand “was not accompanied by a
reasoned analysis of what it meant, how far it extended, and
under what circumstances it might be limited.” 18 Thus, the
impact of the First Amendment on the common law prohibition
against public profanity remains an open question.
What this open question, gap in knowledge, or missing
intent means today is that both sides of the argument—over
whether the modern law can restrict profane speech—have a
legal basis. On the one hand, those against public profanity, can
cite to common law principles and analogies that liken saying
“fuck” to flashing a stranger.19 On the other hand, believers in
free speech for its own sake can cite to the Bill of Rights.20
Centuries have passed since Blackstone preached public
decency,21 and we have seen a shift in what we, as a society,
consider moral and decent.22 This progressive shift has changed
not only what we consider immoral or indecent, but
consequently how we interpret the First Amendment: As our
moral corset loosens, the First Amendment is given greater room
to breathe.23 Or is that generalization too broad? After all, North
14

Id.
Id. (“[W]ere there no analogy to be drawn from any decided case, we hold that,
upon the broad principles of the common law which we have stated, this prosecution
[for use of obscene language] is most amply sustained. Thus, fortified by sound
principles—principles which lie at the foundation of every well-regulated community
(and resting on a basis so immutable)—we are the more indifferent as to precedents
exactly in point.”).
16
See generally id.
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1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT, Adoption of the Bill of Rights § 1:7 (2018).
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Id. (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
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TOWNHALL (May 23, 2017, 4:30 PM)
https://townhall.com/tipsheet/laurettabrown/2017/05/23/gallup-vast-majority-ofamericans-believe-the-us-is-in-moral-decline-n2330938.
23
Sreya Pinnamaneni & Stevie Shukman, The Evolution of First Amendment
Jurisprudence in a Post-Fact World, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2017),
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Carolina rode the criminal public profanity train until 2011, 24
and Virginia is still on board with penalizing profanity. 25 This
Note will analyze the current laws restricting profane speech in
each state and examine the national pattern of repealing laws
that mirror the Virginia statute, which continues to criminalize
public profanity.
This Note consists of four Parts. Part I will explore and
identify an anti-profanity statute deemed unconstitutional, how
it originated, and why it has since been ruled unconstitutional.
Part II will consist of a fifty-state survey evaluating the status of
anti-profanity statutes, both past and present. Part III will
consider how and why these statutes endure: is the statute the
product of a conservative constituency? Has the statute been
dormant in the depths of the penal code, effectively retired from
use? Or is this a situation in which the perfect plaintiff has yet to
come forward and challenge this law? Part IV will conclude that
all anti-profanity statutes are unconstitutional.
I. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANTI-PROFANITY STATUTE
Identifying an unconstitutional anti-profanity statute
consists of two primary components. First, a statute that
expressly restricts the use of “fighting words,” or has been
construed to do so, is likely to be constitutional. Second, a statute
that criminalizes profane language in a specific context or with a
specific intent is less vulnerable to attack as unconstitutional. In
order to identify unconstitutional statutory targets, it is first
important to understand the constitutional statutes that are
exempt from criticism.
In North Carolina, it was a Class 3 misdemeanor “on any
public road or highway and in the hearing of two or more
persons, in a loud and boisterous manner, [to] use indecent or
profane language.”26 This was the language of North Carolina
General Statute 14-197 (hereinafter “N.C. 14-197”), 27 and,
spoiler alert, the law was held unconstitutional in 2011.28 This
anti-profanity statute is an appropriate vehicle for learning how
to identify other anti-profanity statutes, understand their
breadth, and ultimately dismantle them.

http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/culr/2017/10/31/feature-the-evolution-of-firstamendment-jurisprudence-in-a-post-fact-world/.
24
See ACLU, supra note 1.
25
See Vozzella, supra note 2.
26
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2013), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286, § 1.1(1);
see also Vozzela, supra note 2.
27
Id.
28
State v. Elabanjo, No. 09 CRS 54172 (Orange Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011); see
also ACLU, supra note 1.
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In pre-2011 North Carolina, N.C. 14-197 criminalized an
extraordinary amount of behavior that the typical person would
not normally recognize as punishable under the law. A group of
students walking along Franklin Street, swearing loud enough
for passersby to overhear, would be committing a Class 3
misdemeanor. Elderly friends strolling down the sidewalk, using
colorful language at a volume the hearing-impaired among them
can appreciate, would be committing a Class 3 misdemeanor. To
a layperson, something seems strange about a statute that would
yield these results. How then did it take 98 years for North
Carolina to rectify this error?29
A. Defining Profanity: Distinguishing Profanity, Obscenity, and
Indecency
Profanity, the subject of this Note, is a narrow path
through the world of censored content. Included in that world is
obscenity (in its many forms) and indecent content—two similar
yet distinct content categories. It is helpful in distinguishing these
two descriptors to refer to their definitions as provided by the
Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) as
guidance. 30 Per the FCC, “[p]rofane content includes ‘grossly
offensive’ language.” 31 In Miller v. California the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that obscene content “does not have
protection by the First Amendment” and, to be categorized as
obscene, must satisfy the Supreme Court’s three-part test: “[i]t
must appeal to an average person’s prurient interest; depict or
describe sexual conduct in a ‘patently offensive’ way; and, taken
as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.”32 Indecent content includes sexual content that fails to
satisfy the obscenity test. 33 Although the FCC guidance is
helpful, states are of course free to tailor their definitions as they
see fit. As a taste of where state courts have taken this idea, words
that “imply divine condemnation” or “divine vengeance” have
been considered profane words.34 Blackstone, the original antiprofanity puppet master, would be damn proud.

29

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2013), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286 §
1.1(1).
30
See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC CONSUMER GUIDES
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts
(last visited Sept. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Profane Broadcasts]. Note that these definitions
are being used strictly for guidance in this context, and are not the legal standards or
definitions applied to statutes generally.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
33
Profane Broadcasts, supra note 30.
34
Thomas Trenker, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes or Ordinances
Prohibiting Profanity or Profane Swearing or Cursing, 5 A.L.R. 4th 956 (1981).
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For the limited purpose of analyzing statutes that
criminalize words spoken in public, references made to “antiprofanity statutes” will include those statutes that condemn:
offensive, profane, vulgar, and/or indecent language.35 N.C. 14197, for example, forbade “indecent or profane language” when
used in a boisterous manner.36
B. Identifying the Statute: Fighting Words vs. Fun Words
Distinct from pure profanity, fighting words are “those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” 37 In terms of
constitutional protection, “guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”38 The line separating fun
words and fighting words has thus been drawn; a statute
criminalizing fighting words is a constitutional anti-profanity
statute. Conversely, unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes
target profanity for its own sake, unjustifiably punishing fun
words.
The fighting words doctrine has been refined and
narrowed over time.39 Whereas the doctrine originally focused
on the words themselves, the present application considers the
circumstances under which the words were said. 40 Indeed
“words may or may not be ‘fighting words,’ depending upon the
circumstances of their utterance.”41 Explaining the rationale and
importance of this consideration, “[i]t is unlikely, for example,
that [alleged fighting words] . . . would have precipitated a
physical confrontation between [a] middle-aged woman who
spoke them and the police officer in whose presence they were
uttered.”42
The distinction between profanity and fighting words is
therefore crucial as fighting words exist outside the bubble of

35

See infra Part II.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2013), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286 §
1.1(1).
37
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (clarifying that the phrase “fuck the
draft” on a jacket is protected under the First Amendment); see also Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (applying the definition of fighting words to Virginia’s cross
burning statute).
38
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
39
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20; see also Blasphemy and Profanity, 12 AM. JUR. 2D § 13 (2018).
40
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
41
Id.
42
Id.
36
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constitutional protection granted to speech generally.43 Profanity
for its own sake, on the other hand, occupies a place comfortably
within the constitutional bubble,44 much to the forever moral and
decent William Blackstone’s chagrin. In the absence of a narrow
exception, speech “is constitutionally protected regardless of
how vulgar or lacking in taste or social, political or artistic
content.”45 Explicitly, “[a] state may not punish the mere public
utterance of the word ‘fuck’ in order to maintain what it regards
as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”46
Although there is overlap in the literal content of
profanity and fighting words, their paths diverge when it comes
to intent. To be considered “fighting words,” the speaker must
be using personally abusive language and addressing another
person.47 An example of the significant weight a speaker’s intent
carries in this analysis is illustrated in Cohen v. California.48 Cohen
“was observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse . . .
wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ which were
plainly visible.”49 Cohen’s jacket ultimately did not violate the
First Amendment, and the use of “fuck” was not considered to
be in the context of fighting words.50 “No individual actually or
likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on
appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult.”51 In the absence of
a narrow exception, like the fighting words doctrine or hate
speech, criminalizing speech for its own sake violates the First
Amendment.52 Per Cohen, “the State may not, consistently with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public
display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal
offense.”53
Returning to the language of N.C. 14-197, the statute did
not satisfy the fighting words doctrine or any other narrow
43

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
See id. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The line between what is permissible and
not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation
is the line between ideas and overt acts.”).
45
Commonwealth v. Zullinger, 450 Pa. Super. 533, 537 (1996) (noting such narrow
exceptions to constitutional protections as “obscenity, defamation, and ‘fighting
words’”).
46
12 AM. JUR. 2D Blasphemy and Profanity § 13 (2009) (citing Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971)).
47
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); see also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
48
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
49
Id. at 16.
50
Id. at 20.
51
Id. at 20−21 (“The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.”).
52
Id. at 21.
53
Id. at 26.
44
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exception to constitutional protection. Operating outside of the
fighting words doctrine makes a statute like N.C. 14-197 ripe for
constitutional attack. North Carolina’s Disorderly Conduct
statute, on the other hand, includes language that falls under the
fighting words doctrine, criminalizing “a public disturbance
intentionally caused by any person who . . . [m]akes or uses any
utterance, gesture, display or abusive language which is intended
and plainly likely to provoke violent retaliation and thereby
cause a breach of the peace.”54
C. Understanding The Unconstitutional Anti-Profanity Statute’s
Breadth: An Intent Requirement
Criminalizing language simply because it is profane,
rather than because of the intent behind it triggers First
Amendment protection. “[T]he [speech-restricting] statute must
be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only
unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to
protected expression.”55 In other words, as the Supreme Court
clarified, “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity.”56
A reliable means of narrowing a statute such that it
remains constitutional is to include an intent requirement or
comparable limiting provision. A statute that prohibits
“intentionally or knowingly . . . us[ing] abusive, indecent,
profane, or vulgar language in a public place, and the language
by its very utterance tends to incite an immediate breach of the
peace” 57 is of course narrower than its counterpart in another
state that prohibits “[a]ny person, who shall, without
provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . .
opprobrious words or abusive language.”58
From afar, this proposed theory mirrors the Brandenburg
test prohibiting language “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action.”59 In the context of profane language,
however, this idea becomes more complex. Acknowledging that
narrowing the scope of a statute with a defined intent
requirement means that the statute is less likely to be found void

54

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(2) (2013).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”).
56
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
57
2013 TEX. GEN. LAWS 42.01.
58
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518–19.
59
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
55
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for vagueness or overbreadth, states have adopted a range of
intent requirements with varying degrees of success.60
Using the North Carolina statute as an example,
N.C. 14-197 was silent on intent, but included two other limiting
provisions: the offense must take place “on any public road or
highway” and “in the hearing of two or more persons.” 61
Although these requirements are limiting, they did little more
than say it was acceptable to swear alone in an open field, or in
a private place. The present Disorderly Conduct statute,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4, explicitly requires that the individual
use language “intended and plainly likely to provoke violent
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace.” 62
Essentially, the present statute expressly criminalizes “fighting
words” rather than any and all profane language. The literal or
constructional difference between these statutes is that the
former was sweeping and the latter far narrower. The functional
difference is that the struck statute criminalized the speaker’s
profane content (regardless of to whom it was addressed or in
what context), while the modern statute considers intent first and
content second.
Distilling a possible rule from this comparison, a statute
that criminalizes behavior (profane language in a specific context
with a specific intent) is constitutional; a statute that criminalizes
speech (profane language in any context ignoring intent) is
unconstitutional. 63 Unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes are
an affront to the First Amendment and belong in history books,
not “on the books.”
D. Dismantling the Statute: Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness
In a perfect world, a citizen could reach out to his or her
representative in the legislature, explain that an archaic law
violates his or her freedom of speech, and that law would
consequently be repealed. In reality, however, a combination of
red tape, busy schedules, and lack of awareness combine to
perpetuate ancient rules and ideas.
Navigating the dense thicket of tradition, standing, and
creative arguments, attorneys and judges seeking to rid the world
of unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes often forego the free
speech approach in favor of a “void for vagueness” argument.64
60

See infra Part II.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2015), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286 § 1.1(1).
62
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(2) (2013).
63
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197, the exasperated observation: “it’s so fucking
humid today” would constitute a misdemeanor; under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4,
it would not, due to lack of intent to provoke violent retaliation or breach the peace.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(2) (2013).
64
See Pinnamaneni & Shukman, supra note 23.
61
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Illustrating this point, N.C. 14-197 was not struck down as
violating the First Amendment—it was struck down as
“unconstitutionally vague.” 65 The lack of clarity as to what
constituted “indecent or profane language” meant that the law
risked inconsistent application and provided little guidance to
North Carolinians as to what they could and could not say
without risk of committing a misdemeanor.66 “There is no longer
any consensus, if there ever was, on what words in the modern
American lexicon are ‘indecent’ or ‘profane.’”67 Superior Court
Judge Allen Baddour concluded: “[a] reasonable person cannot
be certain before she acts that her language is not violative of this
law, and it is therefore unconstitutionally vague.”68
Funneling through the conclusions above, identifying a
potentially unconstitutional anti-profanity statute becomes a
manageable task. First, a statute that expressly restricts the use
of “fighting words,” or has been construed to do so, is less
vulnerable to attack as unconstitutional. Second, a statute that
criminalizes profane language in a specific context or with a
specific intent is less vulnerable to attack as unconstitutional. The
remaining statutes, those criminalizing profanity for its own
sake, are without a constitutional defense. Unconstitutional antiprofanity statutes belong in history books, where they cannot
infringe on citizens’ First Amendment rights.
II. ANTI-PROFANITY STATUTES ACROSS AMERICA: A
FIFTY-STATE SURVEY
It would be wonderful to say that N.C. 14-197 was the
last of its kind, and its death in 2011 marked the end of a
repressive era. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The stubborn
siblings of N.C. 14-197 live on, for reasons that will be explored
in Part III.69
Utilizing the methods of identifying anti-profanity
statutes explained in Part I (profanity, fighting words, and intent)
this survey will examine the present state of anti-profanity
statutes across America, paying particular attention to those
statutes that are vulnerable to constitutional challenge. First, this
65

State v. Elabanjo, No 09 CRS 54172 (Orange Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan 5, 2011); see also
Judge Strikes Down NC Ban On Public Profanity, FOX NEWS U.S., (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/07/judge-strikes-nc-ban-publicprofanity.html; see supra note 1.
66
See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2015), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws.
286, § 1.1(1).
67
Judge Strikes Down NC Ban on Public Profanity, FOX NEWS U.S. (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/07/judge-strikes-nc-ban-publicprofanity.html.
68
Id.
69
See infra Part III.
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Note will consider these statutes collectively, noting the
commonalities that bind them despite state boundaries. Next,
this Note will separate this body of statutory law into two
categories: those with intent requirements, and those without,
and evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of their
language. Finally, this Note will delve deeper into a select few
statutes that I consider the most dangerous, the most violative of
Free Speech, and the most in need of timely repeal.70
A. Statutory Schemes and Similarities: Disorderly Conduct and Breach
of the Peace
Upon examining all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, every state has a law on the books regulating speech.71
The majority of states stash their anti-profanity statutes under the
umbrella of “Disorderly Conduct;” thirty-nine states regulate
public speech as Disorderly Conduct or a variation thereon. 72
Nine additional states regulate speech as Breach of the Peace or
similar terminology. 73 Four states, including California and
Oklahoma, have statutes that independently criminalize profane
language.74
It is important to note that this is not a zero-sum game:
There are not simply 50 states with 50 statutes—states are free to
enact a multitude of similar statutes, more specific statutes, or
seemingly overlapping statutes.75 Maryland regulates speech via
a sub-section of a much broader statute and uses both of the

70

This survey examined state statutes criminalizing profanity or synonyms thereof.
Notably, I did not consider state constitutional provisions. I did not consider statutes
criminalizing speech: over the telephone or email; on public transportation such as
buses or trains; or as harassment. I did examine statutes pertaining to the distribution
of obscene materials (including pornography) in general, or to juveniles. As
accurately as possible, I limited the surveyed statutes to those that apply generally,
and prohibit profane, offensive, or vulgar language.
71
Of course, this seemingly dramatic statement includes those statutes prohibiting
fighting words, which are not included within the constitutional bubble of free
speech protection.
72
States that fall under this category: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
73
States that fall under this category: Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, and Wyoming.
74
States that have independent statutes: California, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Oklahoma (which has two), and Virginia (which also has two).
75
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983) (“Where . . . a legislature
specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of
whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct under Blockburger, a court’s
task of statutory construction is at an end and . . . the trial court or jury may impose
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.”).
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aforementioned phrases. 76 Mississippi, on the other hand,
regulates profanity in a specific and self-explanatory statute:
Miss. Code 97-29-47 “Public Profanity of Drunkenness” 77
distinct from its general “Disturbance of the Peace” statute. 78
Oklahoma is the big winner, with two independent and specific
statutes on the books: Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 90679 and Okla. Stat.
tit 21 § 1362, 80 prohibiting “Obscene Language” and
“Disturbance by loud or unusual noise or abusive, violent,
obscene, profane or threatening language.”
As one might expect, those states that have enacted
independent anti-profanity statutes (contrasted against those that
criminalize speech as a sub-part of a more general or broad
statute) are those most blatantly violating the Constitution.
Those states, via their independent anti-profanity statutes, are
targeting profanity for its own sake. In addition to a lesser body
of case law explaining the breadth of the provision, these
independent statutes often omit an intent requirement, whereas
speech regulation under the umbrella of Disorderly Conduct, for
example, is subject to the intent requirement imposed on all
behavior or activity that is punishable as disorderly.81
The relative advantages and disadvantages of these two
disparate penal strategies are evident when one compares two
statutes side-by-side.82 On the one hand, criminalizing profane
language under the broader category of “Disorderly Conduct” in
Montana makes it a crime to “knowingly disturb[] the peace by
. . . using threatening, profane, or abusive language.” 83 This
statute is found among the other “Offenses Against Public
Order,” and specifically “Conduct Disruptive of Public Order.”84
Because the statute is a sub-part of disorderly conduct, the law is
explained by considerable legislative and judicial history,
including bill drafts, editor notes,85 and more than fifty notes of
decisions.86
76

MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 10-201 (2018).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (2017).
78
Id. § 97-35-15 (2018).
79
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 906 (2017).
80
Id. § 1362 (2018).
81
Comparing two Virginia statutes: Under VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (2006),
“Disorderly Conduct” requires actors to have “the intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creat[e] a risk thereof.” Under VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (1990) relating to “Profane Swearing,” “[i]f any person
profanely curses or swears or is intoxicated in public” the mere use of profanity is a
crime, absent any intent requirement.
82
For comparative purposes, this Note examines VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (1990)
and MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-101 (West 2017).
83
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-101(1)(c) (West 2017).
84
Id.
85
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-101 (West 2017).
86
Id.
77
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On the other hand, criminalizing “[p]rofane swearing” in
Virginia looks very different. 87 Under Virginia law, “[i]f any
person profanely curses or swears . . . he shall be deemed guilty
of a Class 4 misdemeanor.” 88 This statute is found among
“Crimes Involving Morals and Decency,” and specifically
among “Obscenity and Related Offenses.” 89 As a (relatively)
independent statute,90 there are fewer sub-sections and therefore
fewer comments available.91 There is minimal legislative history
available, and far fewer notes of decision, meaning that there is
little guidance available for attorneys and judges.92
There are, of course, bound to be commonalities among
statutes across this country, including those explained above.
Turning to the differences—and the most important line to draw
among them—the presence or omission of an intent requirement
is key.
B. Intent Requirements: Knowingly and Intentionally Using Profanity
Criminalizing an act that was intentionally or knowingly
done is inherently more specific than criminalizing just the act
itself. Missouri, for example, prefaces its enumeration of what
constitutes “Peace Disturbance” with the requirement that the
act “[u]nreasonably and knowingly disturbs or alarms another
person.” 93 Nevada similarly requires a “Breach of Peace” be
“maliciously and willfully” committed. 94 In total, thirty-six of
the states surveyed 95 criminalize profanity in a statute that
requires intent.96
Criminalizing an act without providing intent via context
is broad and vague (potentially to the point of being void).
Mississippi, for example, requires only that “[i]f any person shall
profanely swear or curse, or use vulgar and indecent language, .
. . in the presence of two (2) or more persons, he shall, on
87

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (1990).
Id.
89
Id. This statute appears in Article 5. Obscenity and Related Offenses of Chapter 8.
Crimes Involving Morals and Decency.
90
This law in its entirety criminalizes “[p]rofane swearing and intoxication in
public”—although it is not strictly profane language, it is narrower than the larger
“Disorderly Conduct” statute in Montana that included sub-sections (a) through (i).
91
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (West 2018).
92
Id.
93
MO. REV. STAT. § 574.010(1)(1) (2017).
94
NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.010 (2017).
95
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
96
Given that some of the states surveyed have multiple relevant laws, there are more
than 50 statutes being considered in this survey. For example, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia appear on both lists discussing intent.
88
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conviction thereof, be fined . . . or be imprisoned.”97 Similarly,
in Michigan, “[a]ny person . . . who shall profanely curse or
damn or swear by the name of God, Jesus Christ or the Holy
Ghost, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”98
Omitting an intent requirement in the context of antiprofanity statutes makes for a much more aggressive law.
Although residents are nonetheless able to familiarize
themselves with the laws, upon committing the offense (even by
accident) there is little recourse. Under this strict liability-esque
regime, to convict a citizen, the state need only prove that the
event happened. Under such a statutory regime, saying “shit” on
the street becomes akin to speeding—it does not matter why you
did it, but you are damned if you do. In total, seventeen of the
states surveyed criminalize profanity to this day without
requiring any form of intent.99
Sometimes, however, even a strong intent requirement
(and neutral language) fails to save an anti-profanity statute from
unconstitutionality. 100 A Rhode Island case, State v. Tavarozzi,
illustrates the failure of such a statute that was found
unconstitutional based on its general prohibition on “loud and
unreasonable noise.”101
Ms. Dolores Tavarozzi was arrested after a “less-thanenviable set of circumstances” following a St. Patrick’s Day party
at a local bar, which required police involvement.102 A visibly
intoxicated Tavarozzi, upon being asked to leave the bar “stated
her address as ‘Alaska’ and began speaking in a loud and vulgar
manner.” 103 As she reluctantly followed the officer outside,
Tavarozzi used “very very vulgar language” and “attempted to
kick [the officer].”104 She “continued kicking so vigorously in all
directions that she kicked off both her high-heeled shoes.” 105
Convicted of both disorderly conduct and assault, Tavarozzi
ultimately defeated the anti-profanity statute when the court
97

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (2017).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.103 (2018).
99
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Washington D.C., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
100
See State v. Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048, 1053 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the relevant
statute was “inapplicable to speech and . . . neither vague nor overbroad when
applied to conduct other than speech”). Tavarozzi’s conviction for “loud, profane,
and opprobrious speech” was consequently “constitutionally impermissible.” Id.
101
Id. See also 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (2008) (“A person commits disorderly
conduct if he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: . . . disturbs another
person by making loud and unreasonable noise which under the circumstances
would disturb a person of average sensibilities.”).
102
Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d at 1049.
103
Id. at 1050.
104
Id.
105
Id.
98
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decided that “[the disorderly conduct statute] constitutionally
cannot be applied to speech.” 106 Although the statute did not
even mention profanity or vulgar language, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he loud and unreasonable
noise defendant was accused of making, however, consisted of
loud and vulgar speech. In effect, the prosecution in this case is
thereby seeking to punish potentially protected speech under the
guise of noise.” 107 In a victory for free speech, the court
concluded “that the state may not impose criminal sanctions
upon speech under the rubric of prevention of loud and
unreasonable noise. Although speech may be noisy and profane,
it may nevertheless be protected save for the rather narrow
Chaplinsky exception.”108
It is worth noting that at least five states have already
repealed unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes and replaced
them with laws that conform to constitutional precedents
protecting freedom of speech.109
C. The Worst of the Worst: An Unconstitutional Most Wanted List
Several news articles proclaiming that Virginia maintains
an archaic law that criminalizes profanity inspired this Note.110
“In the state of Virginia, the code of law suggests that citizens
use no profanity in public . . . [l]etting out an f-bomb in Virginia
is a misdemeanor!” 111 Unfortunately, these articles failed to
mention the host of other states that maintain similarly restrictive
(and unconstitutional) laws.112 The five statutes that follow are
the most egregious unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes; the
five statutes flailing and screaming to be repealed or revised.
1. New Mexico
In New Mexico, “[d]isorderly conduct consists of . . .
engaging in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous,
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct which tends
to disturb the peace.”113 Despite case law interpreting this statute

106

Id. at 1052; see generally 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (2008).
Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d at 1049.
108
Id. at 1053.
109
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, North Carolina, and South Dakota.
110
Emily Merrell, Virginia’s Censorship Laws May Be More Dangerous Than We Think,
71REPUBLIC (Dec. 16, 2017), https://71republic.com/2017/12/16/virginiascensorship-laws-may-be-more-dangerous-than-we-think/; Change Virginia’s Profanity
Law? About &%$# Time, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (Dec. 25, 2017),
http://www.heraldcourier.com/opinion/change-virginia-s-profanity-law-abouttime/article_bdd1dfee-f6c6-56cb-a746-dffe383e7295.html.
111
Merrell, supra note 110.
112
Virginia, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Wisconsin.
113
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1 (2018).
107
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as targeting only fighting words, it appears vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge.114
Comparing this statute to N.C. 14-197, they are
functionally identical. N.C. 14-197 forbade “indecent or profane
language,” used “on any public road or highway,” that was “in
the hearing of two or more persons, in a loud and boisterous
manner.” 115 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-1 forbids “indecent, [or]
profane language” used in public, that is “boisterous,
unreasonably loud, or otherwise disorderly conduct which tends
to disturb the peace.”116 Remove the final clause, and these laws
mirror one another exactly; maintain that final clause, and there
is but one low wall protecting this law from being struck down.
Side by side, this statute is vulnerable to constitutional challenge,
as it violates the same rights that were disputed under N.C. 14197.
Of course, states are not compelled to follow others, and
North Carolina’s decision is not binding on New Mexico.
However, if nothing else, North Carolina’s decision can inspire
additional state challenges, and provide a rubric for future First
Amendment successes.
2. Oklahoma
Under Oklahoma law, “[i]f any person shall utter or
speak any obscene or lascivious language or word in any public
place . . . he shall be liable to a fine . . . or imprisonment . . . .”117
Unlike New Mexico, case law attempting to defend the
constitutionality of this statute is lacking. Instead, federal courts
in Oklahoma abstained from addressing the question to “afford
the State Court the first opportunity” to interpret the law.118
Unlike the statutes in New Mexico and North Carolina,
Oklahoma does not require that the speaker be in the presence of
others, nor does it require the speaker to be boisterous. This
distinction is the nail in Oklahoma’s statutory coffin: without
requiring the speaker to be addressing others or using a specific
tone, there is little to no support for an interpretation of this
114

State v. James M., 111 N.M. 473, 478 (1990) (concluding that the New Mexico
disorderly conduct statute was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad).
115
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2013), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286 §
1.1(1).
116
See articles discussed, supra note 110.
117
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 906 (2017) (noting that there are other clauses that
forbid “obscene or lascivious language . . . in the presence of females, or in the
presence of children,” but, given that the clauses are separated by “or,” they can be
permissibly separated for purposes of this analysis).
118
Brown v. Fallis, 311 F. Supp. 548, 551–52 (1970) (explaining that contrary to
party objection, “where the State statute is fairly subject to an interpretation which
will avoid or modify the federal constitutional question, the court may properly
abstain from the granting of declaratory relief”).
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statute as permissibly forbidding fighting words. As it is written,
this statute criminalizes “obscene or lascivious language” for its
own sake, and cannot seek constitutional refuge.119 Although the
federal court addressing this statute in Brown v. Fallis 120
concluded “we should not attempt to foreclose an interpretation
that may be made to avoid any constitutional infirmity which
might exist, as the Oklahoma courts do,” 121 they were really
leaving the door open to a state court challenge, which is likely
to succeed.
3. South Carolina
“Any person who shall . . . use obscene or profane
language on any highway or at any public place or gathering or
in hearing distance of any schoolhouse or church . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor” in South Carolina.122
Very much like Oklahoma, South Carolina does not
require that the profane language be addressed at another person,
or with a particular intent or inflection. The additional clause
that forbids profane language “in hearing distance of any
schoolhouse or church” provides no constitutional support
because the Constitution does not condone censorship in
proximity to schools or churches. South Carolina consequently
criminalizes the language for its own sake, this is not prohibiting
fighting words, and it is therefore unconstitutional.
4. Wisconsin
Under this final violative statute, “[w]hoever, in a public
or private place, engages in violent, abusive, . . . profane,
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct .
. . in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance
is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.”123
This statute is both more specific and more vague than
the others in two distinct ways, neither of which render it
constitutional. First, unlike other anti-profanity, or even
disorderly conduct statutes, Wisconsin is stepping into the
119

Interestingly, under OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1362, “[i]f any person shall willfully or
maliciously disturb, either by day or night, the peace and quiet . . . by loud or
unusual noise, or by abusive, violent, obscene or profane language, whether
addressed to the party so disturbed or some other person, or by threatening to kill, do
bodily harm or injury, . . . or by running any horse at unusual speed along any street,
alley, highway or public road, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” The
horse clause is not particularly relevant, but it is interesting. Relevant here is the
language expressly prohibiting fighting words. Comparing this statute to OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 906 makes clear that the former is constitutional, whereas the latter is
not.
120
311 F. Supp. 548, 549–50.
121
Id. at 552.
122
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-530 (1969).
123
WIS. STAT. § 947.01(1) (2017).
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private sphere by regulating both public and “private place[s].”124
Second, the threshold for legality under this statute is vaguely
stated as behavior that “tends to cause or provoke a
disturbance.”125 What is “a disturbance?”126 On the one hand, a
tavern brawl sounds like a disturbance. On the other hand,
exclaiming “shit” too loudly while passing a family on the street
could also be a disturbance.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has yet to consider the
constitutionality of this statute. Unfortunately, the case that
brought this statute before the court in 2002 did not include a
constitutional challenge, compelling the court to “decline to
address the overall constitutionality of the statute in this case.”127
5. Virginia
Finally, the statute that launched a thousand words:
Virginia’s blatantly unconstitutional prohibition on profanity. “If
any person profanely curses or swears or is intoxicated in public,
whether such intoxication results from alcohol, narcotic drug or
other intoxicant or drug of whatever nature, he shall be deemed
guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.” 128 I intentionally did not
abridge the language of this statute: it is fully intact, leaving no
room for misinterpretation or persuasion.
Examining the statutory language, there is no intent
requirement, nor any limiting clause narrowing the scope to
fighting words. Instead, the statute criminalizes profane
swearing or cursing no matter the context. Drawing the obvious
parallel, this statute is as bad, if not worse, than N.C. 14-197.
Under the now-dead North Carolina law, the profane speaker
had to be “in the hearing of two or more persons” while being
“loud and boisterous.”129 Although these limitations do not bring
this law even an inch closer to constitutionality, they succeed in
illustrating the sheer breadth of the unconstitutional and
enduring Virginia statute by comparison. As it is written, the
Virginia statute criminalizes profanity regardless of how many
people can hear, meaning it could be zero people. As it is written,
the Virginia statute criminalizes profanity regardless of the
speaker’s tone, therefore including even conversational
profanity. Applying the statute as written, I would commit a
“Class 4 misdemeanor” by walking along a quiet street, tripping
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Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
State v. Schwebke, 644 N.W.2d 666, 680 (Wis. 2002).
128
See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (1990).
129
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2013), repealed by 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws. 286 §
1.1(1).
125
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on an uneven sidewalk, and saying “fuck” as I stubbed my toe
before regaining my balance.
Although Virginia courts and federal courts have
addressed the statute as recently as 2017, it has only been in
regard to the intoxication clause, leaving the profanity clause to
endure, like the fossil that it is.130
The foregoing statutes are the culmination of rigorous
research—the five statutes shouting and waving their arms for a
constitutional challenge. After surveying the fifty states,
exploring how courts have construed these statutes, and
comparing the language and meaning to the now vanquished
N.C. 14-197, these five statutes represent the clearest
constitutional violations. The section that follows will consider
how and why they remain good law, as well as how and why
they should be put down in a timely manner.
III. THE WHY AND HOW OF DISMANTLING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANTI-PROFANITY STATUTE
As a member of the First Amendment Law Review, a law
student, and a general advocate for Free Speech, I
wholeheartedly believe that anti-profanity statutes like those
specifically mentioned in Part II are an affront to the
Constitution. 131 As a human, I wholeheartedly believe that
censorship is a stepping-stone to tyranny.132 As a product of these
many considerations, I say “fuck you” to anyone who tells me
profanity is un-ladylike, inappropriate, or against the law.133 That
is my subjective view. 134 Objectively, a state cannot make
130

See United States v. Wilson, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (E.D. Va. 2017) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss charges, including charges under 18.2-388, after
defendant cursed out a shop employee).
131
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Can Anti-Profanity Laws and the Fighting Words Doctrine
Be Squared with the First Amendment?, ABA J. (Apr. 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/fighting_words_profanity_1st_amen
dment (“In my opinion, laws banning profanity are unconstitutional on their
face[.]”).
132
See Sarah Lynch, Censorship: Tyranny In Disguise, ODYSSEY ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2016)
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/censorship-tyranny-in-disguise (discussing
censorship in literature and the detrimental impact on sheltered children, which is
analogous to censoring profanity and the detrimental impact on society generally).
133
See Gillian Tett, Bad Language: The Curse Of Gender Equality, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/72de2930-bc10-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080
(explaining the trend toward gender equality in utilizing profanity, but not actively
embracing profanity itself); see also Elizabeth Enochs, 11 Things People Get Wrong
About Women Who Love To Swear, BUSTLE (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.bustle.com/articles/143149-11-things-people-get-wrong-about-womenwho-love-to-swear.
134
My passion for profanity was ignited at an early age by the incomparable George
Carlin, free speech fanatic and cunning linguist, whose “7 Dirty Words” (shit, piss,
fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits) changed my life; it is a privilege to
(hopefully) pay tribute to him with this piece. See Timothy Bella, The ‘7 Dirty Words’
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constitutional something that fundamentally is not. Why then do
these statutes continue to exist? On a basic level, the very idea
that we have laws on the books that cannot be squared with the
Constitution is confounding, and yet, that is the country in which
we live. Anti-profanity statutes should be relics, not our reality.
First and foremost, unconstitutional anti-profanity
statutes, like the five identified in Part II, need to be reshaped or
repealed because they are unconstitutional in their present form.
An additional consideration (and cause that I champion) is that
rather than punishing profanity, we should be embracing it:
embracing the health benefits, the expressive benefits, and the
academic benefits, which are explained later in this Note. To
establish a new pro-profanity regime, however, we must first
dismantle the old laws. The sections that follow will examine
how and why these offensive statutes continue to exist, as well
as the numerous pro-profanity arguments and analyses.
A. How and Why Statutes Endure: Perfect Plaintiffs, Stubborn
Conservatives, and Useless Legislators
“Flowers may die, and old soldiers may fade away, but statutes
do neither.”135
1. Wanted: The Perfect Plaintiff
Successfully challenging these unconstitutional antiprofanity statutes requires the perfect plaintiff. 136 The perfect
plaintiff is in the right place, at the right time, with the right cause
of action.137
“A well-selected plaintiff can provide a concrete context
for abstract legal concepts and personalize the stakes.”138 Beyond
the crucial standing requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy, the
ideal plaintiff “must be amenable to the spotlight and both

Turn 40, but They’re Still Dirty, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/05/the-7-dirty-wordsturn-40-but-theyre-still-dirty/257374/.
135
Paul Larkin & John-Michael Seibler, Time to Prune the Tree: The Need to Repeal
Unnecessary Criminal Laws, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/time-prune-the-tree-the-needrepeal-unnecessary-criminal-laws.
136
In a podcast exploring what it means to find the perfect plaintiff in the context of
Supreme Court litigation, Edward Blum has personally found the perfect plaintiff for
six Supreme Court cases, including Fisher v. University of Texas. Additionally, the
podcast discusses the groundbreaking case of Lawrence v. Texas, and the necessity of
identifying a suitable plaintiff even in cases where the law is so clearly
unconstitutional. Edward Blum, More Perfect: The Imperfect Plaintiffs, NEW YORK
PUBLIC RADIO (June 28, 2016), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/imperfectplaintiff.
137
See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 Y A LE L.J. F. 136 (2015).
138
Id. at 137.

2019]

POLICING PROFANITY

85

sympathetic and relatable to the average person.”139 Of course,
these ideas scale up and down depending on the judicial stage on
which they are set: at the Supreme Court, with the eyes of the
world on that forum, a plaintiff is “selected and groomed . . .
with great care.” 140 At the state level, on the other hand, the
stakes are lower: the eyes of the world pay little mind to a meager
state law challenge.141
In terms of identifying the perfect plaintiff to combat an
anti-profanity statute, the biggest hurdle is less likely to be finding
one with the perfect personality, and more likely to be finding
one with a cause of action. It is obvious but nonetheless
important to emphasize that to challenge a law, one must suffer
an injury under that law. Therefore, until someone is arrested
pursuant to an anti-profanity statute, that statute can linger in
legal limbo seemingly forever.
“It’s an unfortunate truth that, once a law is passed, it is
rarely removed from the books.”142 Moreover, as long as they are
not being used, and thus not being challenged, dusty, archaic
(and unconstitutional) laws endure. “Statutes may become
obsolete or fall into desuetude . . . but they retain their force and
effect until repealed by the legislature or held unconstitutional by
the courts.”143 It is for this reason that strange and obscure state
laws remain intact. In Nebraska, for example, “[n]o person who
is afflicted with a venereal disease shall marry.”144 In Illinois,”[a]
person commits fornication when he or she knowingly has
sexual intercourse with another not his or her spouse if the
behavior is open and notorious.” 145 Both of these laws seem
vulnerable to challenge, but, like anti-profanity statutes, they are
unlikely to reach the court absent the perfect plaintiff.146
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Id.
Id. at 138 (citing Amanda Terkel et al., Meet the Couples Fighting to Make Marriage
Equality the Law of the Land, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2015, 2:58 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/17/supreme-court-marriage_n_7604396.html.
141
See, e.g., Tom Joyce, Anti-Cursing Law Is #@!#ing Ridiculous, MOUNT AIRY NEWS
(Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.mtairynews.com/opinion/57395/anti-cursing-law-ising-ridiculous.
142
Adrian Moore, How to Get Dumb, Obsolete Laws off the Books, REASON FOUND.
(Apr. 27, 2015), https://reason.org/commentary/how-to-get-dumb-obsolete-lawsoff-t/.
143
Larkin & Seibler, supra note 135 (defining desuetude as “a legal term used to
describe anachronistic and rarely (if ever) enforced laws”).
144
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (1978).
145
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-40(a) (2011).
146
See Kristin Hunt, The Weirdest Law We Could Track Down in All 50 States, THRILLIST
(Aug. 17, 2015, 4:39 PM) (identifying other examples of strange but enduring laws),
https://www.thrillist.com/entertainment/nation/weird-state-laws; see also Dumb
Laws, LEGAL-FORMS-KIT.COM, http://www.legal-forms-kit.com/legal-jokes/dumblaws.html.
140
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North Carolina was fortunate: Samantha Elabanjo was
the perfect state law plaintiff. She was in the right place on
Franklin Street, at the right time, saying “you need to clean your
damn dirty car” to the right “asshole” police officers who
arrested her for “use of profanity on a public roadway.” 147 In
order for courts in other states to have the authority to strike
these statutes, the attorneys need to find their Samantha.
2. Conservatives Fear Change, or Profanity, or Both
Aside from, or in addition to, statutes enduring because
they are unchallenged, there is a second possible explanation:
conservative representatives and their constituencies like them.
Conservatives can be “less tolerant of compromise; see the world
in ‘us’ versus ‘them’ terms; . . . are ‘motivated to punish violators
of social norms (e.g., deviations from traditional norms of
sexuality or responsible behavior) and to deter free riders.’”148
Potentially damning for the pro-profanity cause is the idea that
“‘[t]he old-fashioned ways’ and ‘old-fashioned values’ still show
the best way to live,’’ a sentiment that conservatives, rather than
liberals supported in a recent survey.149
Not only are conservative values a potential motivator for
maintaining anti-profanity statutes, those conservative
constituencies elect conservative representatives whom they
believe will champion their conservative causes. To make
matters worse for the pro-profanity supporters, a recent study
indicated that “[p]oliticians tend to vastly overestimate just how
conservative their constituents really are.” 150 Conservative
representatives, to a greater degree than their liberal
counterparts, “appear to believe that they represent a district that
is more conservative . . . than the most conservative legislative
district in the entire country.”151
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In terms of how this overestimation impacts the struggle
to repeal unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes, it seems less
and less likely that a conservative legislator would even attempt
to appear pro-profanity if she (erroneously) believes that her
(über-conservative) constituents would be against it.
3. Legislators Spend Time Making Law, Not Unmaking Law
“More often than not, though, elected officials are too
busy making new laws to spend time getting rid of the obsolete
ones already on the books.”152 Successfully getting a law repealed
is therefore an uphill battle, and one that requires national
publicity and divisive issues that rally support. 153 Legislators
working to appease their constituents and colleagues have a full
schedule without the added consideration of working to repeal a
statutory relic. But what if there was a bureaucratic solution to
combat a legislator’s finite amount of time and energy?
Professor Glenn Reynolds has theorized such a solution:
“a third house of Congress whose sole function is to repeal
laws.”154 This “House of Repeal” would create a congressional
body that is incentivized to subtract rather than add to our
current body of law.155 This solution, which would necessitate a
constitutional amendment, would remedy the issues of
inadequate legislator time and demanding constituents. 156
Although Reynolds’ theory is geared toward the federal system,
it could just as easily be applied to the states. Of course, this
radical idea would require fundamentally altering our system of
government at the state or federal level. That being said, drastic
measures are sometimes necessary “usually when the populace
thinks that the existing system is letting them down.” 157 As
Reynolds sees it, “the prospects for constitutional change don’t
look so bad.”158
B. Why Support Profanity? It is a Path to a Smarter, Healthier
Populous
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“People who curse are smart as f—k!”159
Beyond what I hope is the now obvious reason that antiprofanity statutes should be dismantled (just see the U.S.
Constitution), there are persuasive and scientific justifications for
promoting profanity both personally and professionally. 160 On
the professional side, profanity “promot[es] trust and teamwork
in the office”161 Profanity can also “increase the effectiveness and
persuasiveness of an argument” and help to “communicate how
[one] feel[s] about a certain subject.” 162 On the personal side,
profanity both: (1) increases health and happiness 163 ; and (2)
indicates worthwhile personal traits. 164 Profanity’s health
benefits include “increased circulation, elevated endorphins, and
an overall sense of calm, control and well-being.”165
Behavioral psychologist Richard Stephens concluded that
“swearing really does allow you to withstand pain for longer”
based on a study he conducted that involved submerging
subjects’ hands in ice water.166 Compared to those subjects who
could not use profanity, those who did use profanity could “keep
their hands in the iced water for half as long again” than their
neutral counterparts. 167 Profanity can help alleviate pain by
having “a similar soothing effect to drugs like morphine” that
results from the body’s “release of natural, pain-relieving
chemicals.”168 Profanity also serves as an indicator of personality
traits and intellectual ability. “A recent study found that people
who swear often lie less and have higher levels of integrity,”
noting a correlation between “those who cursed and their
honesty levels.” 169 These byproducts of profanity are worthy
causes, and bolster the idea that we ought to celebrate profanity
rather than regard it as taboo, or (more importantly) illegal.
159
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Although “use of obscene or taboo language—or
swearing, as it’s more commonly known—is often seen as a sign
that the speaker lacks vocabulary, cannot express themselves . . .
or even lacks intelligence[,]” studies have proven the opposite.170
In addition to being more honest, pro-profanity people are
thought to have larger vocabularies and “the habit [of swearing]
may be linked with a higher IQ.”171 According to psychologists
at Marist College, the relationship between “verbal fluency”
(which measures a person’s general vocabulary abilities), and
“swearing fluency” (which measures a person’s vocabulary of
swear words or profanity) indicates that “people who scored
highest on the verbal fluency test also tended to do best on the
swearing fluency task.”172
Dispelling the myth that profanity is indicative of lesser
intelligence, “swearing appears to be a feature of language that
an articulate speaker can use in order to communicate with
maximum effectiveness.”173 Not only are unconstitutional antiprofanity statutes trampling First Amendment rights, they are
furthering false ideas to the detriment of smart, honest, wellspoken people to whom swearing is second nature.
IV. CONCLUSION
For three key reasons, anti-profanity statutes are fucking
ridiculous. First and foremost, they are blatantly
unconstitutional. 174 In a perfect world, unconstitutional laws
wouldn’t exist, but in our world, shit happens. Second, antiprofanity statutes remain on the books because they are not a
legislative priority and rarely get their day in court. 175
Unfortunately, we have to hope for citizens to have their
constitutional rights violated and be arrested under an
unconstitutional statute in order for these laws to be struck down.
Alternatively, we lobby our legislators to repeal these statutes.
This option would save innocent citizens from being arrested in
the name of profanity, but would require heavy reliance on busy,
potentially conflicted representatives. Ultimately, there is not a
shortcut to constitutionality, however backwards that conclusion
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might be. Finally, state residents would benefit from uninhibited
use of profanity.176 And yet, despite the pros vastly outweighing
the cons, anti-profanity statutes endure. Criminalizing profanity
stifles intellectuals, who swear more than others. 177
Criminalizing profanity demands that a car wreck victim
suppress her swearing, abide the law, and endure greater pain,
rather than use profanity and violate the law.
Be it during one’s formative years or final years, the
freedom to say fuck is protected under the First Amendment.
Unconstitutional anti-profanity statutes that criminalize
profanity for its own sake, rather than in the context of fighting
words, trample this First Amendment right.
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